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1. Italian Communists’ role in Italian post-war political and economic life, until 
the end of the eighties.  
1.1 The Italian Communist party as an opposition party until the end of the sixties 
The Italian Communist Party was born in 1921 as an emanation of the Third International and did 
follow the fate of the International Communist movement in the pre-war and early post-war years. 
There are a lot of distinguos by sympathetic historians as to the peculiarities of the party and the 
distancing itself from the policies of the international Communist movement. However, the 
emphasized specificity of the party may have amounted more to matters of tactics and to a realistic 
adaptation to a specific national context than to a real differentiation in long-run political 
objectives. Realism and the directives coming from Moscow alike (as borne out by a number of 
documents recently made available from Russian archives),2 while trying to avoid a repetition of 
the disastrous Greek experience of insurgency,3 prompted the Communist leadership in the post-
war period to a policy of sometimes vigorous, but by and large constitutional opposition. The 
legality of the opposition,4 and later a good deal of cooperation in the running of the political 
                                                 
1I must thank Carlo Fusaro and Michele Salvati for useful suggestions. Needless to say, they 
should by no means held responsible for the contents of the present paper. 
2See Aga-Rossi Elena, Victor Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin: il PCI e la politica estera staliniana 
negli archivi di Mosca, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997.  
3For the importance of Greek experience on the stand of the Italian Communist party, see Giorgio 
Galli , Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Milano: Edizioni il Formichiere, 1976 , pp. 248-49. 
4During the period when the organization of the Party was under the leadership of Pietro Secchia 
(1948-55) some preparation for a possible insurgency was made and a kind of clandestine military 
organization was put into place, both in a defensive perspective against the possibility of a non-
constitutional repression against the PCI, and, presumably, in an offensive one in case the 
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system,5 was instrumental in avoiding the prevailing of the tendencies towards violent extra-
constitutional solutions leading to the suppression of the opposition and the instauration of an 
authoritarian, possibly military, government. This authoritarian option was never ruled out by 
sections of the political establishment, and their foreign supporters in the NATO alliance, almost 
until the fall of the Berlin Wall.6 
In the above we can see instances of two features that have characterized post-war Communist 
activity in Italy. The first is the shadow of the international experience of other Communist parties 
outside the Communist block, the other the awareness of the strict limit to the activity of the Party 
provided by the international position of Italy and the all-present danger to repeat the more tragic 
aspects of that experience. Togliatti was settling for the least of possible evils, seen from his 
viewpoint, by accepting the rules of a representative democratic system. He knew quite well what 
the price for not accepting those rules would have been, as well as that the existing constitutional 
rules would have not hindered the Party in the least from taking power and establishing a popular 
democracy, along Central European lines, had a favourable historical situation arisen.7 Besides 
Greece, Allende’s fate in 1973 provides another paramount experience impressing to the Italian 
Communist party a further twist towards cooperation with other political forces, in order to 
minimize the danger of a similar tragedy on the Italian soil.8 A similar impact could have had the 
international situation were to change (for instance in case of an European war, or of NATO 
disintegration). The existence of this organization did not bring about violent extra-constitutional 
activities; however it could have discouraged any idea of an authoritarian turn against the 
Communists, as it made the perspective of a repression much more costly.  
5This cooperation dates back at least to the mid fifties. In the fifties Communist votes were 
decisive for electing the president of the Republic (Gronchi), and members of the Constitutional 
court (1955/56). According to Salvatore Vassallo (Il governo di partito in Italia (1943-1993), 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, pp. 152-153), in the twenty years from 1948 to 1968 on average the 
PCI voted in favour of 74% of the laws which were approved. Seen from another viewpoint, this 
means that in all these laws there was something which the Party approved of. 
6As borne out, among others, by the evidence coming out of the P2 and Gladio affairs, in 
particular. 
7The continuous celebration of that model of economic and political organization was compatible 
with an inner political agenda of this kind. 
8In the Fall of 1973 Berlinguer, then general secretary of PCI, expressed his reflections on the 
lessons of the Allende experiment in an essay published in the authoritative ideological journal of 
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persecution of Communists in a number of countries, in a period when important sections of the 
American establishment favoured the instauration of repressive regimes against constitutional 
legality in countries, such as Greece (1967-1975), with a strong Communist party and an unstable 
social and political structure, to which Italy in some ways could be compared. 
Otherwise the Communist party was performing a very important function in organizing and 
keeping under control the disruptive forces that were pressing from the underbelly of an 
inegalitarian and still half-underdeveloped society towards a revolutionary and violent overturn of 
the existing social and political order, even if its behaviour was in some way contradictory and not 
devoid of ambiguity. On the one hand the Party was enflaming its supporters with revolutionary 
slogans and perspectives, enhanced by the exaltation of foreign revolutionary examples (liberation 
struggles in the third world, later Vietnam) and the recollection of revolutionary violence in the 
war against the Northern Fascist regime and the occupying German forces (Resistenza). On the 
other it was realistically taking into consideration the impossibility of fulfilling those slogans and 
perspectives, in the immediate future, at least. Thus it would organize and keep under control 
potentially revolutionary and violent forces, which were made unable to disrupt the social and 
political climate to the extent they could and would, had nobody hold them in check through the 
organizational power of the Party and the hope and sense of identity bred by a revolutionary 
eschatological view of the future. In a sense the role of the Party was symmetrical to that of the 
Catholic Church, which in the whole of the post-war period, in face of the perceived deadly 
menace of Communism, was very active in conjuring political support for the governing Christian 
Democratic Party and for contributing to social and economic discipline.9 The latter was also 
favoured by a strict control of public information and of public order.  
Thanks to the overall social and political climate Italy enjoyed moderation in the development of 
money wages. This ensured a long and fruitful period of steady growth, accompanied by monetary 
stability and fast growth of employment. Thus the Italian economy and civil society were able to 
the party, Rinascita ("Riflessioni sull' Italia dopo i fatti del Cile"). The final section concluded 
with an explicit reference to the urgency of a political compromise "between the forces which 
represent the majority of the Italian people", in order to forestall reactionary authoritarian 
solutions of the Chilean type (La Repubblica, 11/9/98, p. 41). 
9The opposite but symmetric function of the Party and the Church in maintaining public order and 
organizing consensus is reflected in the contemporary savoury novels of  Giovanni Guareschi on 
Don Camillo and Peppone. 
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progress, consolidating the position of Italy as an industrial power, co-founder in 1957 of the 
European Economic Community. 
Important aspects of social policy, continuing in large measure the social policies of the Fascist 
period, such as the social insurance system, the value erga omnes of collective agreements 
between representative organizations of employers and employees, and large scale programmes of 
council house construction, were used to grant to the toiling masses some measure of social 
protection and to forestall the destabilizing effects of Communist propaganda. The latter was 
directed at extolling the achievements of Soviet-type economies and societies and to stimulate 
workers' claims concerning wages and social conditions, as well as the enlargement of the sphere 
of state intervention. These latter aspects of the Communists' stand found some echo in the ruling 
parties, especially, once the centre coalition was substituted by a centre-left one, in the Socialist 
party. 
The change of regime, made indispensable by the progressive erosion of the electoral support of the 
centre coalition parties, occurred in 1962, through the entering in the parliamentary majority of the 
Italian Socialist party which was until then, as an ally of the Communists, at the opposition. 
Notwithstanding the proclaimed onset of planning (which by and large remained on paper) and 
some striking measures such as the nationalization of electrical companies and the attribution to the 
state of the monopoly of electricity production and distribution, the political change did not bring 
immediate far-reaching consequences. A profound change occurred however at the end of the 
sixties, when the previous modus vivendi broke down. A new generation, which had not known the 
horrors of the war and lacked the vivid recollection of the deprivations of the immediate post-war 
period, and therefore bred high expectations, came to the fore. On the one hand they wanted to 
immediately attain the living standards of the better off, and of the masses in more advanced and 
prosperous countries, disrupting with a break-down of social relations (Autunno caldo, "Hot 
Autumn", of 1969) the non-inflationary progress of the Italian economy, on the other some of them 
wanted to put into practice the revolutionary teaching of the Communist party. Would-be-
revolutionaries or simple trouble seekers got tired of waiting for a revolution that was always 
proclaimed and celebrated with fervour whenever happened somewhere else, especially if it 
fostered the geopolitical interests of the big Soviet brother, [even bloody and corrupt regimes such 
as Idi Amin's in Uganda and Mengistu's in Ethiopia were later hailed as "revolutionary" in the 
Communist press] but was postponed, at home, for the indefinite future.  
The change of climate at the end of the sixties found its counterpart in disruptive economic 
measures favoured by the Left in general, and in particular by the Italian Communist party (which 
was increasing more and more its role as an important part of the political establishment), such as 
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the abolition of the differentiation of base statutory wage rates set in collective agreements 
(gabbie salariali) in 1969, which contributed to the worsening of the occupational problem of the 
South.10 Owing to the changed social and political climate the government often intervened, in its 
mediating capability, in collective negotiations, taking the employees' side against wage 
moderation. The result was a wage explosion which resulted in increased inflation, lower 
investment and larger unemployment, but also in a dramatic reshuffling of income distribution, in 
favour of workers and employees and in an egalitarian direction. 
1.2. The gradual transformation of the Communist party in the role of a truly constitutional 
opposition, and its sharing of power 
As far as their political stand is concerned, Italian Communists were learning from experience. 
We have seen that Allende's experience was important for understanding the dangers associated 
with the taking of power in the face of high expectations towards left-wing demagogic policies by 
their supporters, and high American hostility and likely destabilization. Moreover there was by 
then an ingrained tradition in the acceptance of a realistic de-facto modus vivendi with other 
political forces. The de facto repudiation of any tendency towards revolutionary action, and the 
unreserved acceptance of parliamentary democracy, both in the short as well in the long run, was 
sealed by the uncompromising stand eventually taken (after some initial indulgence) against 
violent action by extra-parliamentary left-wing groups, and then by the Red Brigades. In this 
connection the widespread experience of the Communists in administering local authorities in the 
whole of the post-war period should not be underrated, as providing a contributory factor to their 
democratic maturation. In the seventies, with the compromesso storico ("historical compromise") 
the Communist party, notwithstanding some demagogic and populist drives, fundamentally 
accepted to be a loyal component of the constitutional parliamentary system, and even accepted 
the international place of Italy in the Western camp.11However, important forces inside, but 
 
10Until 1970 the differential in the rate of employment between South and North was diminishing, 
since 1970 was increasing. Cf. Vittorio Daniele, “Divari di sviluppo e convergenza regionale in 
Italia: un esame per il periodo 1960-1998”. Università degli studi Magna Graecia di Catanzaro. 
Dipartimento di Diritto dell’organizzazione pubblica, Economia e Società, Working Paper 
09/2002 (downloadable from http://www.unicz.it/dipartimenti/dopes/danielewpo902.pdf), p. 16. 
11The loosening of the ties with the international Communist movement, which had already a 
significant manifestation in the critical stand taken by the majority of the party towards the 
Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, went as far as Berlinguer's statement in a TV 
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especially outside Italy, infiltrating sections of the army, police, and especially secret services and 
structures of NATO alliance,were not ready to accept the Communist party as a national 
government force, and in order to avoid its participation into the government were ready to 
destabilize the country through the obscure and bloody means of the strategia della tensione, 
inaugurated in 1969, in the wake of the social disturbances of the late sixties, apparently in order 
to prepare the way to an authoritarian takeover, which happily enough did not eventually occur. 
Even the Red Brigades’ kidnapping of Moro (1978), the man who was working for the access of 
the Communists to the government, which still now presents some unexplained odd 
circumstances, could have been favoured, or masterminded, according to some interpretation, by 
the same forces.12 
Indeed, notwithstanding the important part the Communists were increasingly taking in the 
running of the political system,13 there was a kind of consensus that it would be too dangerous to 
allow them to take government posts. Even in the times of the compromesso storico and of 
national solidarity governments, which were supported by a majority extending to the 
Communists, no member of the Party did eventually take government responsibility. The first time 
members of the Party were able to take ministerial responsibility, after they were evicted by De 
Gasperi in 1947, was briefly in April 1993 with the Ciampi government, but by that date the Party 
had changed its name. The process of learning from experience went far enough to eventually 
transmission, which I watched at the time, that "Socialism could better be build under the NATO 
umbrella". 
12This does not mean that Red Brigade leaders were themselves knowing agents of some obscure 
reactionary agenda (as was pretended, adhering to the traditional habits of double-talk and 
disinformation, by the Communist party propaganda at the time). Had they been, they would have 
been killed or remained free. In reality most of them endured long prison sentences. 
13From 1971 to 1987 no law could in practice be approved against the strong will of the 
opposition. According to lower Chamber regulations introduced in 1971 (but sanctioning previous 
modes of behaviour) as a guarantee to the opposition, the agenda of the Chamber had to be 
approved unanimously by all parliamentary groups. In theory, in case of disagreement the matter 
could have been referred to the general assembly. In practice, however, any strong group was put 
in the position to effectively paralyze the work of the Chamber. In 1987 the system was changed, 
after a bitter confrontation, attributing the decisive say to the chairman of the Chamber. It should 
be added that from 1972 to 1994 the elected chairman of the lower Chamber was a member of the 
Communist party. 
 7
 
 
                                                
understand the negative consequences of state ownership and direct intervention under Italian 
conditions and of the negative consequences of the populist policies originally advocated by the 
Italian Communist party itself. By then the Wall had fallen, and the bulk of the former Communist 
party, transformed into the post-Communist PDS14 in 1990, was ready to play an active role in 
government, supporting the austerity policy of the Prodi government that led to the fulfilment of 
the economic conditions (in particular the reduction of budgetary deficit below 3% in 1997), 
which allowed Italy to join the European single currency system from its start in January 1999.15  
1.3 The crisis of the Italian welfare state and of Italian public finances.  
Facing the social turbulence and instability of the seventies, governments and political forces 
resorted to the usual actions of weak governments facing irreconcilable social demands and 
incompatible claims on the distribution of national income, leading to inflation of nominal 
incomes, as well as of nominal wealth, following the massive increase of the public debt. This 
development was conjured by the overcoming of the economic views dominating the action of the 
centrist governments of the first post-war period, that development should at best take place in a 
framework of “sound” finance and stability of the currency, and that government should keep its 
hands off from the daily running of industry in general, and of state industry in particular. The 
new view, which took shape in the sixties, was advocating Keynesian management of aggregate 
demand and direct intervention in the running of industry, in the framework of national and 
regional planning, as well as the implementation of industrial policies.16 It is obvious that this 
view was also closer to the ideological viewpoint of the Communist party and could have 
favoured its organic insertion in the national political process. The outcome was a set of policies 
focused at creating consensus by giving in to the different claimscoming from different sections of 
society. Rank and file workers and employees, through the introduction of the punto unico di 
contingenza (according to which the reintegration of nominal wages to offset inflation was equal 
 
14Partito Democratico della Sinistra ("Democratic Party of the Left"), DS ("Left Democrats" 
since 1999). An important minority group choose to continue to call themselves Communists, 
founding the Partito di Rifondazione Comunista. 
15The finance minister of the Prodi government, Vincenzo Visco, a PDS member, was particularly 
successful in achieving a marked increase of the overall fiscal revenues. 
16For an eloquent representation of the new view at the time see for instance Francesco Forte's 
influential book of 1964 (Introduzione alla politica economica. Il mercato e i piani, Torino: 
Einaudi, 1964). 
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for everybody: a powerful egalitarian mechanism), and political support in industrial disputes. 
State employees, through wage increases and increases in their number and in their privileges, 
such as, in particular, early retirement. The ruling parties apparatuses, through appointments in 
state industries and various quasi-state bureaucracies. Local interests, through the creation through 
constitutional reform of regional self-governments and of the corresponding bureaucracies as well 
as, especially in the South, through the political influence on the choices of the state industry, 
leading often to the support of non long-run viable initiatives. The ultimate folly of building a 
great steelworks factory in Gioia Tauro, in the name of import substitution and job creation, in a 
period in which the world crisis of the steel industry was already looming,17 was averted at the 
very last minute, after the devastation of the Gioia Tauro plain, which was earlier a prosperous 
agricultural area, notwithstanding the vocal opposition of powerful political forces, the 
Communist party included, which wanted the plant to be completed at all costs. 
Many a waste and folly were accomplished in the South, through the de facto alliance of various 
political forces. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists in power in particular were viewing 
direct state, or state subsidized, investment in the industry as a way to gratify and enlarge local 
clienteles and as a source of influence and illegal financial support. The Communists were 
ideologically much in favour of direct state investments and intervention anyway. Moreover they 
would see industrial investment leading to increased industrial employment as a means to enlarge 
their own constituency.  
The generous distribution of fake disability pensions was both a system of facing the social 
problems of unemployment and destitution in the South, as well as a means of building up 
personal support for intervening politicians. This applied also to the enlargement of public 
employment, in particular in the railways and postal services (one of the most sought after 
ministerial posts was always the Ministry of the Post).  
The costs of inflation were supported essentially by savers through negative real rates of interest. 
A set of strict exchange controls and stiff penalties for capital exporters were set in place, which 
however could not avoid massive capital flights.18  
 
17The formal decision by CIPE (the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning) to build 
the steelworks was taken in April 1974, after the first oil shock. 
18Capital flights included assets of those who had imposed the penalties in the first place (ruling 
political elite and political parties) as is borne out from the “lista dei cinquecento” affair (a secret 
list of five-hundred VIPs receiving specially favourable treatment with the complicity of Italian 
monetary authorities). 
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The eighties were marked by two important developments. The first was the end of the 
compromesso storico. The position of the Socialists with Craxi secretary (since 1976) was of 
complete disenfranchisement from Communist influence, reversing the ambiguous and somewhat 
subordinate position, marked by a kind of inferiority complex, which they had towards the 
Communists in the years before. During the period of compromesso storico Craxi kept clearly 
distinct his political stand fromthat of the Communists, in particular during Moro's kidnapping, 
when he was in favour of bargaining with the Red Brigades, while the Communists were 
staunchly against. After the poor show of the Communist party at the general elections of 1979, 
the new government was not supported by the Communists any more. With the pronouncement of 
the Christian Democrats at their national conference of 1980, excluding any future alliance with 
the Communists, the period of compromesso storico was finally over.19 However, the insertion of 
the Communists in the political establishment and in the structure of political power, especially at 
the local level, did continue.  
Another important development was the continuance of the budget deficit policy of the seventies, 
in a profoundly changed international context which did not allow the maintenance of negative 
real interest rates any more. Of great importance was also the so-called "divorce" between the 
Bank of Italy (which had previously de facto guaranteed the financing of budgetary deficits 
through direct or indirect money creation, if the need arose) and the Treasury. In the new 
institutional set-up (which dates back to 1981, but which was eventually perfected in 1993, 
adopting in full the European Union regulations20) this type of subordination was discontinued. As 
a consequence, deficit financing did not result in the rate of inflation getting out of control (in the 
years 1979-1990 the rate of inflation was 10.6%, down from the 16.1% of the period 1973-1979), 
notwithstanding budget deficits to the tune of more than 6% of GDP ( in fact they were higher 
than in the seventies because of the cumulative effects of debt service), but the real rate of interest 
shot to positive levels (the short-run real interest rate was 3.5% as an average in the period 1981-
90)21, making the policy of persistent deficit spending unsustainable in the long run. At the same 
time political corruption, which had developed in the sixties and seventies, involving more or less 
all parties, but in particular the Christian Democrat and the Socialist, reached its acme in the 
eighties. The Socialists under Craxi had developed a conception of political life according to 
which votes could be wooed through expenditure in party organization and propaganda, and in its 
 
19Cfr. Salvatore Rossi, La politica economica italiana 1968-1998, Bari: Laterza 1998, p. 166. 
20Ibidem, p. 111. 
21Enciclopedia dell' Economia Garzanti, Milano: Garzanti, 1992, pp. 1253-1254. 
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turn votes, through corruption and political influence, would result in acquisition of financial 
resources. Paraphrasing the title of a famous book by an Italian economist, we may synthesize this 
conception as "production of votes through money and production of money through votes". The 
model was applied to an increasing unsustainable extent, in particular both by the Socialists and 
Christian Democrats. The minor parties of the so-called arco costituzionale22 were also part of the 
system, with a degree of connivance, and participation at the level of local administrations, by the 
Communists. Apparently the only ones left out in the cold were the neo-Fascists, and, in the initial 
phase of its activity, the Northern League, which later on, having got some levers of local power, 
became also embroiled in corruption episodes. In many cases, especially involving government 
parties, corruption money was used not only for financing the party but for personal enrichment 
too. Particularly blatant was in this respect the behaviour of some Socialist leaders and their co-
workers. A backlash had to develop sooner or later, and eventually led to the fall of the system.  
In order to understand the change of Italian public opinion, which has de facto been tolerant of 
political corruption for a long time, one should take into consideration that political corruption is 
not only a matter of distribution of political influence and wealth. It is also wasteful for what we 
may dub the corruption multiplier, by which the social damages of corruption are a multiple of the 
sum acquired through it. First of all there are the transaction costs, the secrecy, the risk premium 
to be paid to accomplices. Secondly, the efficacy of administrative and political action is 
hampered, as are the rules of competition. The thriving competitors are not the most effective in 
production, but the most effective in oiling politicians and bureaucrats. Thirdly, if the main 
objective of political and administrative action is the revenue of corruption, as to some extent 
seemed to be the case in Italy towards the end of the eighties, the nature of public expenditure is 
affected. The quality and efficacy of interventions is not given the attention it requires, moreover 
those interventions are privileged that produce the highest corruption revenue, independently of 
their merits. There were many anecdotes of public works, especially in the South, and especially 
in the period of high corruption of the second half of the eighties, resulting in bridges without 
roads, in roads leading nowhere, in unfinished hospitals, etc. Corruption money was not simply an 
instrument of power, but had become an end in itself. According to common opinion, towards the 
end of the eighties corruption had reached levels never experienced before. 
 
22"Constitutional arc", the set of parties that were recognizing themselves in constitutional values; 
the neo-Fascists, obviously, were excluded. 
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2. Crisis and reconstruction: the role of the post-Communists as a government 
force 
2.1 The forced end of a political regime and of a consensus system.  
The fall of the Wall was not of fundamental importance in this respect, since the building up of the 
crisis was already ripe, even if it was probably of fundamental importance in allowing the 
Communists (however ex-) to acquire eventually government responsibilities. 
The crisis exploded in 1992, as the determination of the Milan judiciary and the support of public 
opinion, which had become sick and tired of the extent of corruption, nullified the usual system of 
displacing the proceedings in cases of political corruption, as well as all politically sensitive 
proceedings, to Rome through various callous means, with the complicity of the high echelons of 
the judiciary, and in particular of the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione). In Rome a corrupt 
judiciary, colluded with political power, was taking care of stopping them, until eventually the 
crimes could not be prosecuted any more because of prescription. 
At the same time, because of the explosion of public debt, the system of using large budget 
deficits for providing the means for maintaining consensus through public expenditure was not 
available any more, as an increasingly larger chunk of public expenditure was needed for the debt 
service. The crunch came in the Summer 1992, when the Lira went under attack and was 
eventually compelled to float, leaving the European exchange mechanism; the rate of interest on 
state bonds exceeded 16%, in presence of an inflation rate of about 5%23. Only the draconian 
financial measures taken by the Amato government (supported by the traditional Centre-Left 
coalition, but opposed by the Left, and in particular by the post-Communists of PDS) in 
September saved the day and avoided financial collapse. 
Already at the beginning of the nineties it could be understood that the state could not honour in 
the long run the claims of its creditors and at the same time the ingrained expectations of the 
public. Now, the claimants were mainly of two kinds: 1. the holders of state financial debt; 2. 
those entitled to pension claims, according to then existing legislation. There were also some 
additional implicit claims, or expectations, such as the continuance of the especially favourable 
 
23The implicit deflator of GNP for 1992 was 4.7%. (Cf. Mario Arcelli, Stefano Micossi, "La 
politica economica negli anni ottanta (e nei primi anni novanta)", in Economia Italiana, n. 1/2, 
1997, special issue on Storia, Economia e Società in Italia 1947-1997, p. 352) while the rate of 
interest on state bonds with a year maturity  reached 17.79% in October 1992 (source: 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pol_mon_merc/tit_stato/tassi_int/bot_ann. 
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treatment of specific categories of the population: surplus employment of loss-making state 
enterprises, lax working conditions of state employees, specific social measures (cassa 
integrazione guadagni, indennità di disoccupazione speciale) in favour of workers affected by 
layoffs of big firms, leading to a replacement rate of up to 80% for quite a number of years, fake 
invalidity pensions, widespread especially in the South. Calls were advanced for repudiating the 
state debt, in one form or another, proposals that obviously contributed to make more onerous the 
service of the debt in the short run. These proposals were not heeded, however, because of the 
likely consequences for the credit-worthiness of the Italian state in the subsequent period, for 
social peace, owing to the widespread holding of bonds by Italian families, and because they 
would have gone against the basic tenets of the economic constitution of contemporary industrial 
democracies, making of Italy a pariah among them and putting Italy's membership of the 
European Union at risk. The inevitable outcome of this decision was the need to create a primary 
budgetary surplus on the one hand and to deceive some of the expectations mentioned before, as 
well as to revise the rather extravagant pension rules, on the other. The formation of those rules in 
the previous years was prompted by trade union pressure, left-wing demagogy and search for 
electoral support by government parties (in particular by the Christian Democrats). At the time a 
rather curious viewpoint prevailed, according to which the number of jobs was in some way given. 
(This viewpoint seems to be have been left as a distinctive heritage from the old PCI to the 
Rifondazione Communists, who were making of the reduction of the working week to 35 hours, 
supposed to increase employment through work-sharing, a crucial point in their economic 
programme. They even succeeded to force this measure as a commitment on the Prodi government 
in 1997, as a condition for supporting the law of the budget.) Retirement by active workers was 
encouraged, especially in public employment, since their jobs were supposed to be passed over to 
somebody else, correspondingly reducing the number of the unemployed. It was a specific 
instance of the fixed quantity fallacy, often held in the left-wing circles, according to which 
quantities (in particular the number of jobs) are fixed irrespective of price (wages, in the labour 
market) and of other relevant circumstances.24 The so called "baby pensions" system of public 
 
24Such as those affecting supply of entrepreneurship. In a sense demand for labour is tantamount 
to supply of entrepreneurship, which by no means can be taken as given. One can be born rich, but 
to become an entrepreneur, instead of a rentier or an employee, is a specific choice. If conditions 
are made too strict for entrepreneurs, in the name of class struggle, and the position of 
entrepreneurs in society worsens, because "profit" is assimilated to "speculation" as a source of 
unclean incomes in the eyes of public opinion, and is penalized in various manners, this may 
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employment allowed retirement after sixteen years and six months of service only (even less for 
women). Retired state employees would then receive a pension for life.  
At difference with private savers, who could sell their bonds and send their money abroad, 
pensioners or even prospective pensioners could not emigrate for getting paid better pensions 
elsewhere. However, they could retire, before the new intended legislation restricting the rights of 
would-be pensioners came into effect. Lack of resolution in implementing a realistic and long run 
sustainable pension reform led to a worsening of the problem of financing the pension system, 
since scores of workers (and especially of state employees) accelerated their retirement every time 
a reform of the pension system that involved a postponement of the minimum retirement age was 
in sight.  
A first attempt by Amato (1992) to reduce prospective pension claims and increase retirement age 
failed to be decisive, in particular because of the stubborn defense of the privileges of state 
employees by the Christian Democrat Minister of labour Cristofori (of the Andreotti fraction).  
A far-reaching pension reform was attempted by the Berlusconi government in 1994, but failed 
because of widespread opposition by trade unions,25 who organized a successful general strike, 
and widespread opposition by political forces (the post-Communists in particular), which 
eventually led, with the defection of the Northern League, to the fall of the government. 
eventually turn to the disadvantage of workers, unless the state supplies the missing 
entrepreneurship. But experience has shown that the state on the whole is a poor entrepreneur. 
Another tragic instance of the fallacy of the independence of quantity of price is the belief that the 
supply of rented dwellings is independent of the legally imposed conditions of tenancy. This belief 
has led in many a country (Italy in particular) to unrealistic rent control regulations, bringing 
about, the rarefaction or disappearance of dwellings put to rent, as well as the degradation of 
rented urban spaces. This brought great suffering for the class of (especially would be) tenants, 
and hindrance to geographic labour mobility, with adverse consequences on productivity and 
employment. 
25Italian Trade Unions strongly resisted proposal of reforming the pension system, and any 
redistributive measure aiming to reduce the privileges (such as undiminished cumulative 
treatments) of pensioners. Their reluctant acceptance of the Dini government pension reform was 
due to the insertion of discriminatory clauses (such as the maintenance of the more favourable 
pay-as-you-go system) for workers with 18 years seniority and more, who were making up the 
bulk of trade union membership. 
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The reform eventually approved under the Dini government, which succeeded Berlusconi’s and 
was supported by the post-Communists, brought about a restriction of pension rights and an 
increase in the retirement age so as to curb the expansion of pension expenditures and the brake it 
constituted for the economy. It somewhat redressed the situation, but was still far away, according 
to experts, from what was needed, considering the state of public finances and demographic 
trends.  
2.2 The change in Italian society and in the support for the Left 
Partly the change in policy and ideology by the Communists and then by the post-Communists 
was the outcome, not only of past experience, but of a drastic change in Italian society. The 
relative importance of industrial employment, which formed traditionally the basic source of 
support for the parties of the Left, has gradually shrunk, while employment in the services has 
greatly increased. The traditional "working class", the class of manual labourers, in the name of 
which Marxist parties have claimed power in the past, had become a relatively unimportant 
minority section of Italian society. The same applies to the class of "proletarians", destitute 
workers with no significant wealth. Partly these changes have been the natural outcome of 
economic development, partly however were accelerated by the policies once vigorously 
advocated by the Left, and thanks to the advocacy and support of the Left (the Communist Party 
and Italian Trade Union movement in particular) adopted by governments and the legislature. 
Indeed, some of the policies of the Left, which were implemented under the impact of the 
progressive weakening of Centre and Centre-Right forces, and then, in the seventies, in the 
framework of the Compromesso Storico, have been self-defeating in the long run for the political 
interests of their advocates. The exceedingly myopic and demagogic measures of rent control (in 
particular since the approval of the equo canone, in 1978) nearly destroyed the market for rented 
dwellings, contributing to the attainment of a particularly high home ownership rate (only 22,8% 
of families were living in a rented home by 1995).26 Real estate ownership in turn does not seem 
to be particularly favourable as a contributing factor for being ideologically oriented to, and 
voting for, the Left. The measures leading to a marked increase in workers' rights, and in the cost 
of labour for large enterprises, in the official economy, from which small enterprises were exempt 
(Statuto dei Lavoratori, May 1970), have resulted in a reduction of the employment provided by 
large firms, and an increase of the relative weight of small firms and self- employment in the 
Italian productive structure, much above than in the other industrialized countries. Owners and 
 
26ISTAT, Rapporto sull’ Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996, p. 134. 
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managers of small firms, as well as the self-employed, are in turn much less likely than workers 
and employees of big firms to hold left views and to vote for the Left. This process has also been 
favoured by the short-sighted defense of employment in loss-making and doomed state 
enterprises, at the cost of huge public subsidies, policy that has subtracted resources from the 
development of viable public and private enterprises and brought the whole state industrial 
ownership system into disrepute. The fate of the loss-making Bagnoli steelworks, where huge 
investments were made in order to maintain employment, only to be scrapped somewhat later, is 
in this respect a good case in point. The increasing labour costs in the official economy, following 
the wage push and normative changes of the late sixties and seventies, in the industrial sector in 
particular, contributed to the decline in the relative importance of industrial employment (a big 
reserve of votes for the Left), through both its scale and substitution effects (robotization by Fiat 
following the dramatic increase in labour costs in the early seventies is an emblematic instance of 
the latter).27 The egalitarian policies of the seventies (following the punto unico di contingenza, 
according to which wage indexation was not proportional, but in absolute terms) aroused the 
resentment of the intermediate cadres against the egalitarian push.28 All these social 
transformations, which were objectively accelerated by the policies favoured by the Left, made up 
the breeding ground for the shift of Italian society towards the Right, which in 1994 led to the first 
center-right majority government from the onset of the Republic,29 with the participation and 
support of former neofascists. 
Another contributing factor was the overall social impact of some of the policies pursued. The 
persistent large scale transfers to the South for implementing policies of by and large ineffective 
industrialization, which eventually had to be discontinued, and of straightforward social support 
 
27”In 1976 Fiat's Torino Mirafiori factory adopted the first automated system for bringing car 
bodies and their mechanical parts together” (From: http://www.Fiat.com/e/default.htm.) “In 1978 
production methods were revolutionised with the introduction of Robogate, the world's first 
flexible robotised body assembly system in Fiat's Rivalta and Cassino factories.” (Ibid.) 
28This found its expression in Turin in the marcia dei quarantamila (a march by Fiat cadres in 
protest against trade unions’ activities in October 1980, a turning point in the social climate of 
those years). 
29The centre governments of the post-war period had a left-wing component in the left-wing and 
populist fractions of the Christian Democrats and Social-democrat, which was lacking in the 
Berlusconi government. The populist components of the latter, such as in particular the Northern 
League, does not have by all definitions a left-wing connotation. 
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through transfers, at the expense of Northern taxpayers, as well as the lax attitude towards 
immigration and petty crime, alienated popular support in previously left-wing voting strata, to the 
advantage of such forces as, in the North, the Northern League and, in the South, the Neofascists. 
Mass illegal immigration in particular has been associated in popular opinion, as well as in 
statistical data, to increased criminality.30 Moreover low income beneficiaries of public social 
expenditure were not particularly happy to share its diminished resources (due to the primary 
surplus needed to keep the service of the public debt under control) with an increasing wave of 
illegal immigrants, as by and large advocated by the Left, in the name of social solidarity. At the 
same time the attitudes of the Left towards immigration have progressively changed. After the 
signature of the Schengen protocols a new, stricter, immigration law, proposed by the PDS 
member and veteran Communist Interior minister Napolitano, was passed in March 1998, but this 
hardening was viewed as too late too little by some of the disaffected urban masses that in the past 
would have voted for the Left. Moreover the law was accompanied by still another mass 
regolarization for illegal immigrants. In the immigration issue, as in other matters, the Left did 
gradually learn, but not fast enough to avoid not to be taken aback by otherwise foreseeable 
developments. The immigration law approved during the Prodi government, with the introduction 
of administrative detention of illegal immigrants pending expulsion, would have sounded 
anathema to left-wing parties, and not only left-wings ones, some years before, when the much 
milder Martelli law was passed (in 1990), among uproar by left-wing critics. At the same time two 
years only after the previous comprehensive immigration law, another one was passed, under the 
Amato government, in December 2000, modifying the previous one in a repressive sense.31 On the 
whole the immigration issue is quite tricky for the Left, in Italy as elsewhere. Industrialization, 
public education and social expenditure alike, together with the egalitarian wage push of the 
 
30Cf. M. Barbagli, “Sul rapporto fra immigrazione e criminalità in Italia e negli altri paesi 
occidentali ” (exerpt from his book Immigrazione e criminalità in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino, 
1998), http://www.comune.torino.it/cultura/intercultura/12/12c1-5.html 
31An overall review of recent Italian immigration policies can be found in Harlan Koff, 
“Immigrazione o integrazione? Dibattito pubblico e sviluppi concreti”, in Mario Caciagli e Alan 
Zuckerman (eds.), Politica in Italia: I fatti dell’ anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 2001, 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001, pp. 185-203. 
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seventies, succeeded in markedly reducing the inequalities of postwar Italy.32 Immigration 
provides a supply of relatively unskilled labour force endowed on the whole with lower levels of 
human capital (considering also the specificity of the latter for the social and economic 
environment). Thus immigration has the potential to increase the dichotomization of the labour 
force (aside from the persisting dichotomy between official and underground workers), and the 
creation of a structure of inequality based on stratification along ethnic lines. The intrinsic 
inequality of society is bound to increase as long as immigration is not restricted, no matter what 
are the redistributive policies pursued, as the amount of resources which could be commanded for 
redistribution is limited and the supply of foreigners from the poorer countries of the world is 
practically unlimited: no feasible amount of redistribution can create a relatively equal multiethnic 
country if the worse off from abroad are free to immigrate, or if controls are kept lax.  
2.3 The post-Communists' role in government. Financial stabilization and institutional change 
Before leaving power to the victorious Right in 2001, the governments that ruled with Communist 
support, but first of all the Prodi government, which was the direct outcome of the electoral 
victory of the Left in 1996, were able to set a few landmarks that could not be easily overturned. 
With the Bassanini33 laws of 1997 the rules presiding the functioning of Italian bureaucracy were 
made more reasonable, and its discipline was strengthened. Secondly, a number of privatizations 
were made, notwithstanding the brakes put by Rifondazione as well as by the Right opposition, 
reducing substantially the extent of the state sector, and in particular of loss making state industry 
and contributing to redressing state finances. But most of all the entry from the start into the 
European Monetary Union presents Italy with the straitjacket of a budget constraint which puts a 
limit, so long it holds, to the resources available for the renewed pursuit of populist and 
kleptocratic policies, since it makes unavailable the resources obtainable in disguised form 
through excessive state deficits and inflation.34 The historical merit of the governments supported 
 
32Cf. Andrea Brandolini, "The distribution of personal income in postwar Italy: source description, 
data quality, and the time pattern of income inequality", Temi di Discussione no. 350, 1999. 
Rome: Bank of Italy. 
33Himself a Pds minister. 
34The present Berlusconi government, which on the whole has a Eurosceptic attitude, contrary to 
the governments of the Left that were unreservedly pro-European, appears to resent gravely this 
limit and tries to get away with it, especially through forms of “creative accounting” engineered 
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by the post-Communists has been to bring about this development under very difficult conditions, 
making almost impossible for the future the return to the inflationary populist policies of the 
seventies that the Communists themselves had, at the time, contributed to form and support.  
2.4 The neo-Liberal policies of the post-Communists: necessity or choice? 
It is not too easy to apportion the responsibilities as well as the merits for the policies pursued by 
the governments sustained by the main post-Communist party, namely Ciampi (1993-1994), Dini 
(1995-96), Prodi (1996-98), D’ Alema (1998-2000), Amato (2000-2001), even if it is obvious that 
the policies of the governments Prodi and D' Alema and Amato can be more definitely ascribed to 
the post-Communists, since the PDS (later DS) not only was the main supporting party but also 
had the strongest delegation in government. On the whole it is striking that by no means can the 
policies of the governments supported by the post-Communists be identified as the traditional 
policies of the Left; rather they correspond to a great extent to the policies which in many 
countries are ascribed to the liberal or neo-capitalist Right. Instead to the Keynesian expansion of 
public expenditure and deficit spending, we have here both containment of public expenditure and 
of the budget deficit.35 Instead of an expansion of social expenditure, a curbing of social 
expenditure, while some monitoring of its efficiency was attempted. Instead of nationalization we 
had large scale privatization.36Instead of dirigism and limitation of private initiative, we had 
by Finance Minister Tremonti, such as, for instance, such wasteful measures as the sale of public 
building, immediately leasing them from the new owners afterwards. 
35However, the successful action of PDS Vincenzo Visco (who served as Minister of Finances, 
with Prodi and D’ Alema) in fighting tax evasion can be seen as a kind of left-wing policy as well 
as good administration. Moreover the great reduction of the real interest rate, following the 
curbing of the size of the debt relatively to National Income first, and the abolition of the 
exchange risk following the participation in the EMU later, has greatly reduced the share of 
financial rents in disposable national income, much more than the taxation on financial rents 
originally proposed by Rifondazione Communists would have done, and this can be certainly seen 
as a welcome progressive by-product of overall macroeconomic policies. 
36An important step towards the privatization of public utilities was taken through the approval of 
the rules for the establishment of the authorities controlling privatized public utilities, 
notwithstanding the hostility of the Right, which wanted to hamper the privatizations of the Left. 
This paved the way to the most financially successful privatization of the Prodi government, that 
of Italian Telecom. Other notable privatization engineered by post-Communist supported 
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liberalization and enhancement of competition.37 Instead of increasing workers’ protection in the 
labour market, measures of labour market liberalization were undertaken.38 To this it must be 
added some liberalization of the market for rented dwellings, attenuating the regime of rent 
control (December 1998). Finally we may mention the streamlining of the bureaucracy and some 
reduction in the privileges of state employees following the Bassanini laws mentioned above. In 
part these policies, as we have seen, were compelled by the constraints which the Left inherited, in 
part were the result of the choice to join the Monetary Union with the first group of countries 
(itself clearly not a traditional left-wing decision, taking into account the dominant free-market 
ideology of the Union). 39 
governments have been those of state-owned banks, and of part of ENI. However the desire to go 
further was hindered by the opposition of the Rifondazione Communists towards of the majority 
holding of ENI and the privatization of ENEL (the state monopoly for electricity production and 
distribution), until the exit of Rifondazione from the majority made the privatization of a good 
chunk of ENEL possible (34.5% in November 1999).  
37The liberalization of retail trade, reducing the constraints to business activity to the detriment of 
to the vested interests of incumbents, was brought about by a decree proposed by the Pds minister 
responsible for trade and industry Bersani in March 1998. It is interesting to note that the 
measures towards market liberalization and enhancement of competition were opposed by the 
Right in the defence of specific interests, such as those of shopkeepers.  
38All this did not go without hefty contrasts. For instance at the February 1997 National Pds 
Conference D’ Alema’s position, favourable to increasing flexibility and mobility in the labour 
market, was clashing with Cofferati’s opposite views (Luciano Bardi and Martin Rhodes (eds.), 
Politica in Italia: I fatti dell’ anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 98, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998, pp. 
10, 91). Similar contrasts between the Pds leadership and the Party’s trade-unionist wing occurred 
later in the same year (ibidem, p. 19), and on other themes, such, in particular that of the reduction 
and rationalization of welfare expenditures (ibidem, pp. 90-91). It goes without saying that 
positions similar to those of Pds’ internal opposition were held by the Rifondazione Communists. 
All this was of particular relevance in a year where crucial economic decisions were taken, 
leading to the decision of Italy’s admission in the EMU the following year. 
39 Some elements of dirigism, albeit under the garb of decentralization and concertation, in the 
name of the subsidiarity principle, have resurfaced in the so-called programmazione negoziata, 
leading to institutional arrangements akin to the European Employment Pacts, which in practice 
have performed as a vehicle for conveying investment subsidies (partly of European origin), up to 
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But this is only a partial explanation. In reality the mainstream post-Communists, albeit not all of 
them, have learned a good deal from the past and have realized that some traditional left-wing 
policies were not really in the interest, at least in a long-run perspective, even of the classes which 
the old-time Communists claimed to represent. Moreover, as we have seen, the social constituency 
of the party had changed.40 The process of cultural maturation, in particular the maturation of 
economic experience and the understanding of economic constraints, has borne its fruits. This can 
be seen most clearly if we look at the economists of the main post-Communist Party who have 
nothing in common with the Marxist ideologically oriented economic experts that the PCI had in 
the past. On the whole in Italy there has been a great evolution, marked by the effort towards 
bridging the gap with the level of economic knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon world. For many years 
a number of Italian banks would use some small part of their profits for setting up scholarships, 
sending young Italian economists to specialize in the best American and English universities. A 
number of offsprings of old time prominent Communist leaders(such as Barca, Cossutta or 
Reichlin) went to specialize in the best American or Western European graduate schools, while a 
number of left-wing oriented economists trained in American or British Universities and with 
some international research experience have become involved with the Italian post-Communists. 
Indeed, it may be disputed whether, as a consequence of their changed attitudes, the post-
Communists (the Rifondazione splinter party and the internal left wing opposition excepted) may 
be still considered a part of the traditional Left any more, or rather a progressive liberal centre-left 
party, in the same mould, say, as Tony Blair’s Labour.  
80% of the actual investment, to the South and the relatively more depressed areas of the North. 
But its actual practical relevance has been limited. For a synthetic review see Vincent Della Sala, 
“Il «nuovo sud» nella nuova Europa: il caso di Sviluppo Italia”, in: Mark Gilbert and Francesco 
Pasquino (eds.), Politica in Italia: I fatti dell’ anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 2000, Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 223-244. 
40 For the changes in the attitudes of the rank and file party members see Rinaldo Vignati, “Il 
leader e il partito. Il Pds dopo il II congresso”, in: Luciano Bardi and Martin Rhodes (eds.), 
Politica in Italia, cit., pp. 87-108. Not only the constituency of the main post-Communist party 
did change, but also that of Rifondazione Comunista. The latter, “unlike the old PCI, appears as a 
party of state employees, with guaranteed employment, rather than of workers” (Oreste Massari 
and Simon Parker, “Le due sinistre tra rotture e ricomposizioni”, in: David Hine and Salvatore 
Vassallo (eds.), Politica in Italia: I fatti dell’ anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 99, Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1999, p. 68). 
 21
 
 
Then, one may ask further, what remains of the old Socialist ideology? Is the latter completely 
lost?  
The answer should not be necessarily on the affirmative, if one refers, not to the Socialism of the 
means (such as state industry, planning, inflationary state expenditures) but to the Socialism of the 
aims, where obviously the main aim which distinguishes the Socialists from the Liberals may be 
seen as the egalitarian one. While carrying on the removal of the pathological features left over by 
the previous system (unsustainable levels of state expenditures and of state indebtedness, a chaotic 
and inefficient system of social security, the inefficiency of public administration and the 
privileges of state employees) the Socialist viewpoint could guide the reconstruction of a viable 
redistributional system and an equitable social security system, which could be sustainable in the 
long-run, to the advantage of the worse off. In a world in which the faith in the power of direct 
management and planning by the state has been, perhaps irretrievably, lost, it is in the 
management of the structure and the level of state revenues and expenditures, as well as in the 
setting up of the overall legal framework of the market, that the Socialist egalitarian aims of 
government action could best be retrieved. In this perspective the footsteps of those coming from 
the Communist and Socialist traditions and those of egalitarian minded liberals (as well as of 
solidaristic minded Catholics) could eventually meet in the same path (perhaps under the shadow 
of the olive tree). However the construction of a progressive party of the Centre-Left (the Ulivo) 
has been hampered by the divisiveness of the quarrelsome Centre-Left parties, each attached to its 
autonomy and specific historical background, and the assertiveness of the more important and less 
important political leaders, attached to the preservation of their autonomous political space. At the 
same time, inside the post-Communist Left the old damaging quibbles between the realism of 
those with social-democratic or social-liberal inclinations and the more radical instances of the 
populists and of the wishful thinkers are enhanced, since the electoral victory of the Right in 2001, 
by not having to exert the restraint and compromise required by the responsibility of ruling the 
country. But without such restraint and compromise the opposition may leave Berlusconi and the 
right-wing parties, which in the overwhelming Berlusconi’s control of the means of 
communication find the cohesion and the constraint that lacks to the Left, in power for the 
indefinite future. 
